Conflict is an inherent feature of all human societies. It cannot be eradicated, because it springs from two main sources which are material scarcity and disagreement over authoritative allocation of values. This however, has made political violence, ethnic and religious conflict deeply rooted in the governance of the Nigeria State. The phenomenon has equally become a quintessential laboratory for the analysis of our political, economic and social failures. The implications on sustainable development are obvious since everything revolves around ethnicity, religion and regional interest. Consequently, the underlying variables, intrigues, and objectives for political participation, and support for ethnic or religion identities, are not for national development, but rather, crude or primitive accumulative of the national wealth, a situation which has made our politics absurd, fluid, lacking ideology, focus and directions. The broad aim of the paper is to explain the relationship between colonialism, political socialization, ethnic politics and sustainable development. The paper adopts three models, namely: the system structural, the group conflict, and the relative rising expectation and frustration aggression model. The paper recommends that for the Nigeria State to develop, true federalism and democratic culture should be upheld. This will make all the component units equal and ideologically rooted.

Keywords: Conflict, Violence, Ethno-religion, Colonialism
concept of the state of nature has been used to point up various contrasts important to particular writers. Hobbes argues that the state of nature depicted conditions in the absence of political power/authority or in the absence of the artifice of the state. Locke’s thought of the state of nature is antecedent to the formation of civil society. Rousseau feels that the state of nature was associated with man in a pre-social, pre-linguistic world. In Christian thought, the state of nature or man’s natural condition was likely to be assimilated to what was thought to be his biblical fate, and the story in Genesis especially chapters 1-3, contrasted natural innocence with sinfulness after the fall. The many meanings of “natural” in this context embrace a characterization of human nature, for example, the orthodox Christian account saw human nature after the fall as inevitable flawed. This paper argues that the state of nature simply refers to lawlessness, violence and crisis that debase human philosophical and psychological intelligence and general understanding. It also connotes actions that are not led by reason and intellect but rather appetite, desires and passion for primitive accumulation of crude wealth.

Considering the political violence, ethnic and religious conflicts that occurred in Nigeria from 1999 – 2009, it is obvious that during this period, Nigerians lived in a state of nature as our experiences revealed outright savagery, banditry and brutality in a naked fashion and unprecedented form. All these contrasted the social contract theory of the state as espoused by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the summation therefore is that civility means absence of extreme disorder and violence.

The study is aware of the fact that violence and conflict is inherent in human society, eradicating them is usually not easy as it is rooted in material scarcity and disagreement of values. Violence is therefore endemic to political life. The pre-political state of nature is often depicted as a place of indiscriminate violence, which we escape by forming a political society under the rule of a centralized authority called (The State) that claims a monopoly and the legitimate use of violence. When the legitimacy of the state is challenged, and legal routes for voicing one’s dissent are closed, citizens once again resort to violence. This can take different forms, from civil disobedience, terrorism, and to outright revolution (Ake, 1989:17). The standard definition of violence refers to an act of force exerted to impact physical harm or injury on another person. This definition is inadequate on at least three accounts. It refers exclusively to physical harm or injury, neglecting psychological abuses or attacks. Only other people are listed as the potential victims of violence, whereas animals or inanimate objects can also be the targets of violence. It assumes that there is a direct link joining the perpetrator and the victim of violence, overlooking the fact that violence often generates an indirect ways. A more accurate but cumbersome definition of violence would belong to the following lines:

(A). violence is the direct or indirect physical attack, injury or psychological abuse of person or animal; or

(B). the direct or indirect destruction or damage of property or potential property.

This richer definition of violence provides a more accurate standard for determining the conditions of non-violence, as Ake points out, apart from deliberately inflicting harm (direct violence), creating economic misery, repression and alienation should also count as types of violence (structural violence). What distinguishes general “violence” from political violence? An act of violence is political when it involves the actual or potential violation of someone’s basic (fundamental) rights. Acts of political violence are illegitimate when the rights of the victim are unjustly violated. For example, sexual violence or domestic violence is the violation of basic right to non-interference, or a right to self-ownership, which is why sexual or domestic violence are political issues.

All these are determined by the balance of forces among all those contending for this power. This balance also determines whether or not influence in the use of power will be shared among what number of people and groups or dominated by one or few people. This influence affects the spread of interests for which state power will be used. The struggle, which produces this influence, is unending. It continues as long as there are people who are not satisfied with the
influence that they wield in the use of state power and are willing to do something about it. Even those that are not involved in the struggle are affected by the state power as victims or beneficiaries of the implementation of the state policies. They are, therefore, indirectly or involved in politics. If politics is conducted this way, then, the state of nature has not changed because violence is not one of the recommendations of the social contract theory.

**Conceptual Overview**

Violence or the threat of violence is a universal phenomenon. Individuals and groups throughout history, have, in one form or another, resorted to violence or its potential use as a tactic of political action. Violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power, and by groups in the process of losing power (Anifowose, 2006:1). Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed and in fear of displacement by the threatened. For many decades, however, the study of Political violence was given relatively scant treatment in social science literature. Thus, Smith notes:

Violence has always been part of the Political process protest activities of one form or another, efforts to dramatize grievance in a fashion that will attract attention and ultimately the destruction or threatened destruction of life and property appear as expressions of Political grievance even in a stable, consensual societies... The ultimate ratio of Political notion is force. Political activity below the threshold of force is normally carried on with the knowledge that an issue may be escalated into overt violence if a party feels sufficiently aggrieved (Smith, 1968:111 - 128).

Writing in the same vein, Charles Tilly remarks: “collective violence has flowed regularly from Political process... men seeking to seize, hold, or realign the levers of power have continually engaged in collective violence as part of their struggle (Charles, 1969:4-5).

However, the paper rejects the perspective, which sees violence as a phenomenon carried outside the boundaries of normal Political life. On the contrary, the contention here is that Political violence is worthy of Political inquiry. Nigeria (1999 – 2009) affords a good case for both the theoretical and empirical study in Nigeria are fundamental comparable to those of civil violence in other part of the world. Nigeria rioters share with their counterparts throughout the world certain psychological characteristics; most of them feel frustrated in the pursuit of their Political and economic goals and in seeking redress for grievances, as a consequence, they are angered, and because of their immediate social circumstances, they feel free or desperate enough to act on that anger. The examples of armed revolt in the west immediately after the 1965 parliamentary elections in which the opposition parties believed were blatantly rigged. This frustration can also be used to describe the “Rebellion” of the TIV for most part of the first Republic of 1966. The protest that followed the June 12, 1993 Presidential election throughout Nigeria: the general condemnation of the 1999, 2003 and 2007 Presidential elections by both the international observers and Nigerian opposition parties... The recent Ekiti re-run Governorship election protest where old women had to walk the streets bare – naked while expressing their frustration and anger.

For the sake exceptional clarity, the discussion is preceded by a brief clarification of political violence. The concept of violence deities any precise, commonly, accepted definition. The concept often serves as a catch all for every variety of protest. Military, coercion, destruction, or muscle flexing which a given observer happens to fear or condemn (Charles, 1969:8). The frequent conceptualization of force, and violence tends to confuse the distinction between “legality” “legitimacy” and specific acts often, force is taken to mean legal and legitimate use of violence by a government for the protection of the state, (like the present pounding and bombardment of the militants in Niger-Delta). While violence is interpreted as, illegal and illegitimate acts carried out by non-governmental individuals and groups (many isolated cases of
politically motivated killings or assassinations from 1999 to 2009, kidnapping in the South East and South-South are considered as an act of illegal violence).

Drawing heaving from the above rhetorical questions, the paper is of the opinion that, violence as a concept and phenomenon suffers a lot of meaning. A glance through the rapidly growing literature on the subject would show the bewildering medley in which the concept is presented in the definitional exercise by scholars are enough background for this paper to embark on a conception of political violence. One limiting factor towards evolving a comprehensive and acceptable definition of violence is the multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary nature of the phenomenon. Thus, most effects towards the definition of this concept are often said to be the reflective of the bias of the individual defining it. This dilemma has led Henry Bienen to pessimistically argue that since violence subsumes so much, it may be impossible to formulate good theories, which account for it (Henry, 1968:5). Violence to start with is a human conception, phenomenon and carries overtones of violation. Thus, it has come to be associated with illegitimate force. From this point of view, violence occurs when any group in a political system oversteps its constitutional bounds to the extent that some other groups experience some degree of constraints. In this conception, the Police, for instance, may in the process of administering law and order, use force in so far as it is legitimate. However, it becomes Police brutality when the legitimacy of the use of force is questionable. By implication, when force is legitimately used, it is must often not equated to violence. It is in this content or direction that Wolin defined violence as force exercised with unnecessary intensity, unpredictability or unusual destructiveness (Wolin, 1960:83).

A major problem here identify by this study is that to consider violence only in the sense of violating or physically forcing may be too restrictive. This is because it has been established that there can be a certified case of violence or forcing without visible physical constraints at all. Johan Galtung argues that, there can be a permanent state of violence without a physical manifestation or a permanent state of violent actor. The papers opine that, violence exists in societies where there are deliberate and sustained conditions in which people live below subsistence level. Also, injustice wherever it occurs, is a form of violence and it can be and must be proclaimed that it constitutes everywhere the leading form or violence. The human cost of structural violence, it is argued, far exceeds the cost of physical violence and it is very invidious, fluid, absurd and complex.

Two contending views are immediately apparent. The first is appropriateness of conceptualizing political violence as illegal opposition against the political establishment. It has been argued that violence used by state to maintain itself should be construed as political violence. The second is how to differentiate political violence from other forms of violence since it is possible to subsume all forms of violence under political violence.

Without contradiction to any legal court or prejudice, the second contention derives from the prevalent view that political violence means the use of force or attack, which is prohibited by the state. By implication therefore, political violence subsumes such other forms of violence as religious violence, domestic violence, structural violence among others, since in one way or the other they may result in acts prohibited by the state. Considering the fact that the generic term is political violence, can a form of violence be subsumed under another? Here, the paper proposes two ways of resolving these conceptual problems. The two propositions are embedded in the theoretical conception of the role of the state in a political system. In the descriptions of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau in the social contract theory of the state, the state of nature according to these philosophers was a situation of free-will disposition of individuals to do whatever they liked. This attitude, or orientation breed corruption, injustice and naked violence. We have witnessed similar situation in Nigeria from 1999 to 2009 (see appendix for detailed records).
The Contradictions of the Nigerian State as a Nation-state

The notion of Nigeria as a mere geographic expression (Awolowo, 1990:35) was engendered by the forcible packaging by colonial authoritarian fiat of unwilling communities of diverse origin and culture under the same polity. Consequently, relations and political behavior of the peoples are characterized by mutual suspicion, avarice and invidious hatred since they are strange bed-fellows, who were only coerced into the Nation-State via amalgamation of 1914. Until 1960, Nigeria was a British colony; like most colonies, it was not constructed for internal coherence, but rather for the administrative convenience of the British (Shively, 1997:39). Over 250 different languages and dialects are spoken within its borders, and there is also an important religious split, as the north is primarily Muslim and the south is predominantly Christian.

Attendantly, ethnocentric politics, sectional solidarity and primordial interests became prominent features in the nation’s political practice. Sectional and individual virtues and interest rather than collective virtues and national unity are advanced and exalted. Thus, communal orientation precluded any attachment to the State and the syndrome of the ‘son of the soil’ took preference over merit and competence in the choice of policies and leaders. Nweke aptly expressed this ethnic problem as follows:

One of the most striking characteristics of Nigeria’s its singular ethnic diversity, a demographic tapestry woven of more than 200 different ethnic groups, where except for the effect of migration are often geographically homogenous and often coincide with linguistic, cultural and religious groupings (Nweke, 1994:3). Besides the heterogeneous ethnic composition, about 400 languages are also spoken, thus making Nigeria the linguistic crossroads of Africa (Tordoff, 1990:2). Although as Obasanjo and Mabogunje aptly observed, colonialism provided scaffolding of holding the different communities together, not much change was achieved in altering communal mentality and predilection (Obasanjo & Mabogunje, 1992:4). Nonetheless, the persistent military incursion into government and politics did much harm for the body polity as national issues was mostly tribalized and primordial virtues exorted. These regimes had primordial outlook and sub-national mentality under which the Northern part of the country was favored brazenly, on one hand, and the southern part was deliberately dealt with in terms of appointments, contracts, location of government parastatals, political oppression and repression as well as provision of social services and infrastructures. Political parties were formed on ethnicity rather than ideology.

The persistent ethnic chauvinism exhibited by these regimes had grab effect on the psyche of the various ethnic nationalities to an extent that those groups that even benefited now lay claim to marginalization at every attempt to reverse the status quo. How do you explain the new interpretation of section 145 of 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria? This is nonetheless the cause of the plethora of violent conflicts at the communal level in virtually all the regions of the country, cries for nationalism and calls for national conference. A new dimension to the issue is the increasing recruitment of ethnic militia with reckless abandon in the early 1999. From the Oodua Peoples Congress in Yoruba land to Arewa Peoples Congress in The North; the Bakassi boys in the East and the Egbesu in the South-South, agitation are rife and it is obvious that the nation state will face dire consequences if cogent steps are not taken to checkmate these contending interests.

Both the colonial powers and the elites that succeeded them have used ethnicity for their own ends. In combination with poverty and shortage of resources this has sharpened ethnic divisions. As a result, ethnic sectarianism has left a trail of destructive violence and even threatened the territorial integrity of Nigeria (IDEA, 2001:89).

However, ethnic identity can give social and other benefits as we have seen in other parts of the world (south Africa, the USA, Kenya and Ghana). The challenges for Nigeria is to boost its positive potentials while minimizing the negative, to harness the similarities among the various ethnic groups for national unity, to manage their differences so as to ensure harmony and foster co-operation among them in order to accomplish national integration. Although attempts have
been made along this frame by past regimes, such strategies were never put together and executed in the interest of the country but of policy formulators and executors, who often smile to the bank after each moment of discourse on ‘the forward’.

It is apposite to state that the current wave of violent crises in Nigeria is a by-product of an accumulated deprivation, destruction, marginalization, anger and frustration of the past. Thus, there is need for government and extra-governmental efforts to lessen the spate of violent attacks between ethnic groups in Nigeria. As espoused by Abdullahi Ali, ‘we have offended one another in Nigeria. The Igbo needs to forgive the Hausa and the Yoruba needs to reconcile with the Igbo. The Hausa/Fulani and Kataf, the Ijaw and Itshekiri, Aguleri and Umuleri, the Modakeke needs the Ife (Abdullahi, 2007:12)

The implication of these persistent ethnic conflicts and rivalry is the insecurity of lives and properties which will continue to hinder foreign economic relations to jumpstart the economy. The above position was canvassed by the Vice President Atiku Abubakar at a press conference on Tuesday, November 9, 1999 (on the spate of ethnic violence across the polity). He started among other things that:

Our nation is at the threshold of rebuilding its image as well as its economic and social foundation. Confidence of both the citizens and the international community is fast returning (Atiku, 1999:19). Thus; all hands must be on deck to stop the wave of this ethnic violence.

Religious Intolerance and the Nation State

The political, ethnic and religious contradictions that Nigeria faces are daunting. The country is essentially a heterogeneous society, with the two monotheistic religion-Islam and Christianity-enjoying the loyalty of most Nigerians. A sizeable fraction of the population still prides itself as being pure religious traditionalists, meaning adherence to one or the other of the many traditional religions. The origins of the employment of religion as an instrument of politics in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era. Although the British colonialists claimed to have Nigerians on the imperative of secularity in a multi-religious society, available evidence suggests that the colonial administration consciously employed religion as an instrument of pacification. This attitude is reflected in the formation of political parties in Nigeria before and after independence. Examples shows the

As Adigun Agbaje has correctly established, the colonial administration ‘underwrote Islam in the Northern part of colonial Nigeria, and used it as the basis of political authority in local administration (Agbaje, 1990:288). It not only kept Christian missionaries from the North, so as to preserve the assumed Islamic homogeneity of the region, it also adopted the emirate system of political administration with its strong religious content. In spite of this early of event that opened the floodgate of religious antagonism was the decision of the government to secretly grade Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of Islamic Countries, OIC, from that of an observer to a substantive one (Mimiko, 1995:261). This move was seen by Christians as a ploy to turn Nigeria into an Islamic State against the spirit and the letter of the constitution.

This singular action of the Babangida regime as at that moment marked the epoch of intractable intra (in the case of Islam) and inter-religious violence in Nigeria. This pattern continued even after the Babangida regime due to inability to distinguish categorically the place of politics as the modus operandi of the distribution of national wealth and religion as the spiritual aspect of human being guarded by God (Oduola, 2000:12). Adigun Agbaje’s 1990 optimistic thesis that ‘Nigeria under a democratic dispensation would likely witness a lessening of tension over religion and politics’ (Agbaje, 1999:289) is been negated by the plethora of religious crises erupting across the polity. The nascent democracy is witnessing increasing religionization of politics and politicization of religion due to the resolve of some Northern State’s governor’s to adopt the Islamic legal code—Sharia, as the penal and criminal codes in their states. With Zamfara State blazing the trail, eleven other Northern States have followed suit.
The Post-sharia argument is that for many years, Moslems have undergone humiliations of their faith being relegated to the background in public matters whereas antagonists view the Sharia issue as a grand design to undermine the present government and cause confusion. The series of violent confrontation being witnessed at present is a demonstration of the fundamental problem of religion that has created acute insecurity in the land. Generally speaking, communal and religious clashes which now occur at frequent interval in Nigeria, especially during this democratic regime is not novel, it is only that National Integration that was hoped on democracy is being further pushed back. An attempt is made below to showcase these occurrences.

Colonialism as the Root Cause of Conflicts in Nigeria

Under colonialism, Nigerians lost the variable of relative autonomy, which defined the basis of their interactions with their neighbours in the pre-colonial era. Indeed, not only did colonial conquest eroded the basis for independent action between these groups but the fundamental shift from an essentially agrarian communal economic system and patterns of interactions to a pseudo capitalist system based on the exportation of cash crops, facilitated the insertion of pre-colonial social relations into the colonial economic.

The above quotation point to the fact that colonial period is an important landmark in the history of the country because it shaped and determined the polity of the state and its subsequent ethno-religious and political antagonism and violence. Adebisi (1999:7) pointed out that the seeds of ethnic violence in Nigeria were soon by the British with the adoption of a divided and rule tactics, which later robbed Nigerians of the common front for nation building. This tactic paved way for the emergence of regional parties, interests and leaders whose manifestoes were designed along ethnically motivated interests.

Egwu (2001:45) posited that the constant political, ethnic and religious violence that characterized the Nigerian state is attributable to the history and processes inherent in the state formation during the colonial and postcolonial era. According to him, the colonial state was the foundation upon which the post colonial state was built therefore the process of ethnic identity formation and the political use to which such identity is put were determined by this process. Presently, the Nigerian state, he argues, is a violent institution and to a large extent a crisis generating mechanism because the development of a bourgeois nation-state based on respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the institutionalization of democratic order and governance was not the priority of the colonialists in building the Nigerian state.

In the same vein, Ekeh (1996:9) observed that the trade as well as colonialism was important landmark in the efforts to build the Nigerian state. According to him, the ethno-religious and political violence as well as insecurity that engulfed the eighty years of the slave trade resulted in (i) “laying the foundation for ethnic/kinship behaviour”(ii) “the devaluation of human worth”, (iii) the intervention of the trajectory of the economic development of the Nigerian state; and iv) “the engendering of a fatalistic worldview as the appropriate response to” problem of discontinuities in social structure and processes (Ekeh, 1996:12; Abdullahi, 2007:6). By its exploitative tendencies, colonialism generated an extreme scarcity and unbearable scope of inequality gave rise to the destructive socio-economic competition within and between ethnic groups in Nigeria (Abdullahi, 2007:29).

The unequal competition started with the amalgamation of 1914 when the Northern and Southern protectorates were united to make Nigeria. This union was seen more of as “marriage of inconveniency” because the whole process was conceived and executed without due respect to and for the socio-cultural and political differences embedded in the political, economic and social structures of the wedded couple. Following the amalgamation of Nigeria, a council was constituted for the newly created politically entity. The council made provisions only for the establishment of executive and consultative arms with little or no power to neither exercise legislative nor executive powers. Because of the inherent crisis in the council it was abolished and a seemingly more reliable one was constituted. It was called the Clifford Constitution. With the
Clifford Constitution of 1922, a legislative council was set up in Lagos to legislate for the colony and the Southern province with the exception of the north, which was under the proclamation of the Governor. Though this constitution made provision for an election for the first time, only male adults who earned up to 100 pounds per annum, an amount that was difficult to earn by the natives then, and who had resided in the area for at least a year, were eligible to vote. With an obvious fault in the constitution it became a target of attack by the Nigerian nationalists because the Nigerian who was serving in the council was mere passive participants. This led to the abolition of the Clifford Constitution.

Having aborted Clifford Constitution, the Richard constitution was adopted when Richard became the Governor of Nigeria in 1946. This constitution provided for the division of the country into regions, each built around one of the major ethnic groups and this has continued till date. Ironically, each of these dominant groups had its own history, customs and languages distinct from one another. Within each of these major ethnic groups there were numerous other ethnic groupings with distinct cultures. Hence, this constitution planted the pattern of political rivalry, which now characterized political competition in the nation body politics. This pattern continued to manifest until unnecessary suspicions and fear of domination led to the political uproar over the distribution of power between the North and the South at the General Conference in Ibadan in 1950. Unfortunately, this ill-fated development has continued to shaped political calculations between the two segments of the federation.

The search for an enduring system of government for heterogeneous country like Nigeria necessitates the adoption of a federal system of government. In deed, world over, federal systems are conceived as political arrangements that afford (an) opportunity for the myriad diversities within a political system to find legitimate expression (Alkali, 2004). In a federal system of government, constitutional powers are shared among the components units that are constitutionally recognized and largely autonomous (Abdullahi, 2007:29). In Nigeria the true experimentation of federal government started in 1954 with the introduction of the Lyttleton Constitution. Before this time the country was managed by the colonialists under a decentralized unitary system of government (Jega, 1998:6).

Jega (1998:7) in Abdullahi (20007:30) Nigeria federalism adopted by the British was conceived as an administrative convenience and was meant to provide for unity in diversity. The constitution was meant to safeguard, protect and preserve the cultural differences and at the same time lessen the mutual fears and suspicions among the ethnic groups with a view to lay the foundation for national development, progress and advancement. This became necessary against the backdrop of the ethnic diversity of the Nigerian state. However, the purposes of federalism are yet to be actualized in Nigeria. Instead of uniting Nigerians, the non-faithful application of federal principle has succeeded in disuniting the people the more, resulting in fears and mutual suspicions consequently leading to religious, ethnic and political violence. According to Abdullahi (2007:30) the appellation of the term “federal” in Nigeria is just in names. He argues that Nigeria federal system is characterized by over concentration of political powers at the centre. This has resulted in overdependence on the federal by the component states. Hence, he sees federalism in Nigeria as:

...that form of government where the component units of a political organization participate in sharing powers and functions in a cooperative manner through the combined forces of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity, among others and which also tends to pull their people apart (Afolabi, 2006:164) quoted in Abdullahi, 2007: 129).

Osaghae and Suberu (2005:23) in Adullahi (2007:30) gave the following as some of the characteristics and weaknesses of the Nigeria’s post civil war multi state federalism.
The economic over-centralization of the federation, which has explosively focused partisan, sectional and factional political and economic competition in the country on the control of the central government, with devastating consequences for national integration and stability.

"The centralized funding of sub-federal authorities that continues to stimulated ethnic and sub-ethnic pressures for the formation of new sub-national units as an avenue for easy access to national oil revenues”

"The proliferation of sub-federal administrative boundaries and identities, in a context defined historically by discrimination against settlers and non-indigenes, which has led to a sharp contraction of the geo-political space in which a Nigerian can claim indigene status within a particular state and enjoy full citizenship rights”.

Nigeria’s distributive multi-state federalism, which is based essentially on the massive redistribution of resources from the oil-rich Niger Delta to the rest of the federation, has engendered violent struggles for local or regional ‘resource control’ in the oil-rich region”.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Drawing heavily from the above analysis, it is obvious that political violence, ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria from 1999-2009 occurred as a result of a combination of factors. The exact cause of the various violence from 1999-2009 remains unclear, though, it appears to be related to ethnic and religious differences between Muslims and Christians. For example, the recent violence in Jos is as result of a combination factors, including social apathy, economic deprivation and political frustration. What is happening is Jos is a development that has been recurring in the last two years. It is an exhibition of the failure of governance in Nigeria. It is an exhibition of a very serious economic problem that Nigerians finds themselves in, it is a consequence of breakdown of law and order. People lose sight of the real problem in the midst of economic crisis. Consequently, people exploit the most visible differences between groups. In the case of Jos, it was the religious difference was exploited. The paper do not see anything religion. Wherein religious could be the difference between two warring factions, fundamentally, it’s a manifestation of economic deprivation. Social apathy, political frustration, economic deprivation and so many factors, are responsible. Therefore it is the opinion study that, the federal government and Plateau state government over the years have failed to appropriate public resources in a way to alleviate the suffering of the people. The fundamental truth therefore is that, social and economic are the factors that in the first place precipitated the crisis making the city of Jos a flashpoint of religious violence leading to the deaths of 1000 people in 2001, 700 people in 2004, 900 people in 2007, 2009 people in 2009 and 1000 people in 2010.

The summary therefore is that, democratic values, principles and ideology have been neglected over the years. The conclusion is that the issues of political participation, socialization and culture have been treated with outer levity thereby making most of our comments purely subjective, situational and emotional. The paper recommends the following that:

- Since the Nigerian federal system of government has done little in addressing the problem of political violence, and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, the issue ‘sovereign national conference’ which centered on resource control should be given attention it deserves:
  - Although efforts were made to ensure peace among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria, much still need to be done to address the problems of poverty, inequality, injustice, and underdevelopment. This will promote democratic leadership and good governance;
  - Political violence and ethno-religious conflicts are direct consequences of failed state, breakdown of law and order. The issue of accountability and the rule of law should be taken seriously;
Governments at all levels should take political participation, socialization and culture seriously to make our citizens have new value, orientation and ideologically rooted.

References

Appendix
Records of Political Violence in Nigeria, 1999-2009

CATEGORY “A”

1. September 9, 1999
   Enugu State: Mr. Sunday Ugwu was murdered: A case of mistaken identity. The victim was an elder brother of Hon. Nwabueze, the target who is a member of Enugu House of Assembly.

2. December, 21, 2001
   Osun State: Odunayo Olabaju was murdered at Ile-Ife, Osun State. A victim of political violence, he was a member of the Osun State House of Assembly. His death was “unfortunately” linked to the political Intra-party crisis in the state.

3. December, 23, 2001
   Osun State: Chief Bola Ige, Late Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Federal Republic of Nigeria. He was gunned down in his bedroom by yet to be identified gunmen. Although his death remained a riddle, his assassination was also associated with the Intra-party crisis in Osun State.

4. March 05, 2002
   Oyo State: Mrs. Emily Omonye, Her death was a result of acid poured on her inside her car; she was a prominent member of Alliance for Democracy (AD).

5. August 13, 2002
   Ondo State: Janet Olapade, a prominent Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) leader stabbed to death by assailants, many youths, for preventing them from pasting posters of a chairmanship candidate on her house. This was presumably a political conflict.

6. August, 15, 2002
   Alhaji Ahmed Patehi, Kwara State PDP Chairman murdered along with his orderly when his car was accosted on his way to Abuja. He was killed at Aihetoro, Kogi State.

   Anambra State: Victor Nwakwo: The victim was the younger brother of Authur Nwakwo, a highly profile politician and founder of the Eastern Union Mandate (EUM). He was killed inside his house at about 1:00am.

8. September 01, 2002
   Anambra State: Bar. Barnabas Igwe, Chairman, Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Anambra State chapter. He was brutally murdered alongside his pregnant wife, Mrs. D. Igwe on the same day.

9. September 13, 2002
   Bauchi State: Alhaji Isyaku Molid, the victim was until his death, the National Vice – Chairman of the United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) for the North-West, possibly a result of political violence.

   Lagos: Mr. Dele Arojo: The victim was the Peoples Democratic Party’s (PDP) gubernatorial aspirant for Lagos State.

11. December 13, 2002
   Rivers State, Mr. Ogu Itolo, an elected Local Government Chairman under ANPP was killed on his way from Port-Harcourt.

   Oyo State: (30 people mostly elderly men) unspecified names died from gunshot wounds. This was an Intra-party clash at the Oyo State secretariat of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP).

   Yobe State: Adamu Waziri: He was killed during an Intra-party conflict between the rival gangs from ANPP and PDP.

   Delta State: A soldier and 3 youths killed. Clash over PDP primary elections. The cause was the rivalry between factions within the PDP.

15. February 3, 2003
   Ondo State: Ishola Ayedemi was murdered. It was caused by factional fighting in the Alliance for Democracy (AD) Party.

16. February 9, 2003
   Borno State: Mallam Inwu Kabo, Assassination attempt on the life of the speaker, Borno State House of Assembly, his driver was killed.

17. February 24, 2002
   Imo State: Chief Egonuaya Uche. Senatorial Candidate under the ANPP, Imo State was murdered.

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