Chapter Fifteen

THE NEXUS BETWEEN HOMELAND-SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT IN THE NIGER-DELTA AND THE THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

By

Enojo Kennie Enojo

Abstract
The study evaluates the organic linkage between homeland security and development in the Niger-Delta region and sustainable democratic development in Nigeria and concludes that there is a strong synergy between the threat to national security and development in all part of the country as a multiplier effect with specific attention to the issue of homeland security in the Niger-Delta region. The study recommends a holistic review of our security system. The approach adopted is the structural-functional; this is considered most appropriate as it deals on inputs, outputs, information and authoritative allocation of values.

Keywords: Homeland security, sustainable development, and threat to national peace

Background to the Study

Homeland security is an umbrella term for security efforts to protect the United States against terrorist activity. The term arose following a reorganization of many United States of American government agencies in 2003 to form the United States Department of Homeland Security after the September 11 attacks, and may be used to refer to the actions of that department, the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, or the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security. In the United States, the concept of "homeland security" extends and recombines responsibilities of several government agencies and entities, including the United States National Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United States Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration, and finally, the Civil Air Patrol (Pipes, 2010:67).

The George W. Bush administration consolidated many of these activities under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a new cabinet department established as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. However, much of the nation's homeland security activity remains outside of DHS; for example, the FBI and CIA are not part of the Department, and other executive departments such as the Department of Defense and Department of Health and Human Services play a significant role in certain aspects of homeland security. Homeland security is coordinated at the White House by the Homeland Security Council, currently headed by John Brennan. Homeland security is officially defined by the National Strategy for Homeland Security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur". Because the U.S. Department of Homeland Security includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency, it also has responsibility for preparedness, response, and recovery to natural disasters. The term became prominent in
the United States following the September 11, 2001 attacks; it had been used only in limited policy circles prior to these attacks. The phrase "security of the American homeland" appears in the 1998 report *Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy* by Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow. Homeland security is also usually used to connote the civilian aspect of this effort; "homeland defense" refers to its military component, led chiefly by the U.S. Northern Command headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The scope of homeland security includes:

- Emergency preparedness and response (for both terrorism and natural disasters), including volunteer medical, police, emergency management, and fire personnel;
- Domestic intelligence activities, largely today within the FBI;
- Critical infrastructure and perimeter protection;
- Border security, including both land, maritime and country borders;
- Transportation security, including aviation and maritime transportation;
- Bio-defense;
- Detection of radioactive and radiological materials;
- Research on next-generation security technologies (Mintz, 2010:13).

**Introduction**

Conflict is an inherent feature of all societies, and it springs from two roots that cannot possibly be eliminated; these are, material scarcity and disagreement over values which are to be authoritatively allocated in any given society taking into consideration of who, when, and how these values are evenly distributed. The reason is predicated on the simple assumption that the material resources are limited in quantity and different people and groups often subscribe to so many and different values, principles, hiding usually under the ideological cover of ethnicity and religion. No doubt, this situation obfuscates the core values and principles of federalism, democratic participation, representation, and the issue of homeland security and sustainable development of Nigeria (Agarah, 2010:7).

However, since the modern State is a welfare state, the hope of democracy usually is that the outcome of any political conflict in whatever form will eventually create more winners rather than losers. Consequently, it is on rational scaffold such as this, that an effective homeland security and development in Nigeria is wheeled into an intellectual theatre for an invasive examination especially, as we prepare for the 2011 general elections. The broad aim of this study is to explain the intrinsic variables, factors or conditions that underline the complexity, elusiveness, fluidity and absurdity of federalism, the core issue of resource control and collective security of the Niger-Delta. Regional conflict has become endemic in Africa, especially in the last two decades. In many parts of the continent, inter-ethnic conflicts has deteriorated into wars that have claimed lives of hundreds of thousands of people (Mbaku, 2001:59). Recent examples include Kenya, Chad, Sudan, Niger, Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the Darfur region. In other words, management of diversity is a problem that has proved problematic to the leadership of the continent. This is because most African nations have extremely heterogeneous populations. According to Mbaku, et al., (2001).

In sub-Saharan Africa, for example there are over 2000 distinct ethnic societies. These ethnic groups vary in size, with some, having as few as 100,000 members and others encompassing millions of people. Other characteristics such as language, religion and culture make the African population more heterogeneous (Mbaku, et al., 2001:1).

Even though, the mere number of "ethnic units" or linguistic groups may not necessarily imply serious divisions in society if individuals do not identify strongly with these divisions. But, individuals consider themselves as members of certain ethnic group before identifying with the state. In fact, in most cases Africans enjoy dual

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citizenship and their loyalty is divided/shared between the two levels of states: the civic state and the ethnic state (Oluwasuji, 2006a: 55). It is the tension created by the simultaneous operation of these two different conceptions of citizenship that creates persistence conflicts and insurrections between sub-national and national loyalties in a multinational state. This manifests itself in a more serious way in Africa’s codification of ‘indigene’ and ‘non indigene’ diction. This identification is reflected in how individuals associate in social, political and economic spheres. In a more succinct way, Mbaku, et al., puts it that:

Strong ethnic identification frequently results in the exclusion and marginalization of some groups from the mainstreams of national politics and the economy. Groups compete to control the political machinery, and once in power adopt policies that favour some groups at the expense of others (Mbaku, et al., 2001:3).

In most Third World Countries, wide spread internal conflicts and insurrections are norms rather than exceptions, and these conflicts almost always have strong ethnic and religious components. Nigeria has some distinctive attributes, which characterize it among nations. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country yet, it is one of the world’s most deeply divided societies. Nigeria is a plural society characterized by different languages, cultures ethnic groups and geographical regions.

The adoption of federalism, since 1954 and the advent of democracy in 1999 have not been able to attenuate the ethnic insurrections in Nigeria. Rather, the rivalries inherent in democracy have increased ethnic tensions and violence (Oluwasuji, 2006a). In the recent times especially in the last one and half decades, the Niger Delta question has become seemingly irresolvable. The region plays host to the most violent ethnic militia groups in the country with the aim to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government (The Guardian, Sunday, Jan., 14, 2007). The Niger Delta question can be explained with two possibilities. The first possible explanation stems from the deprivations of the people to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, albeit within the framework of a true federal system. If anything, the deprivations are denials of the people for the right of self-determination and have become very angry and therefore attempt forcefully after years of perceived suffering and oppression, to do something about their situation. (PEFS Monograph, No. 8).

Another possible explanation is the technique of political control by the dominant ethnic groups, who had been decisive in determining the level of development in the area. The politics of “who gets what, when and how” is usually an important point of consideration in this regard. To aggravate the Niger Delta question is the evolution of legal instruments of repression as strategies of systematic domination and deprivation by the federal government. The various legislations and decrees are the legal instruments that have led to the exploitation of the land and resources of the Niger Delta. Our argument is predicated on this point of view that the ethnic uprising and insurrection activities at the Niger Delta arise in reaction to “various legal instruments of repression as strategies of systematic domination and deprivation” which had subjected them to economic inequality and internal colonization.

Theoretical Framework: Structural-functional approach

Structural functionalism has been found particularly useful in the comparison of political systems. According to Gabriel Almond, one of the chief proponents of the approach in political science, every political system performs certain functions. Taking David Easton’s systems analysis as a starting point, Almond looks for the functions which could be included among the input and output functions of all political systems. On the input side are the functions of (1) interest articulation and (2) interest aggregation. Second, on the output side are the functions of (3) rule making, (4) rule-application and (5) rule adjudication. The functions of (6) political communication is undertaken to inform all within the political system and outside of these diverse activities. Additionally, every system performs (7) systems maintenance and adaptation functions through political
socialization and recruitment of people.

According to Almond, the functioning of any political system may also be viewed in terms of its capabilities defined as 'the way it performs as a unit in its environment.' The concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive and responsive capability are employed as criteria to assess how a system is performing within its environment, how it is shaping its environment and how it is being shaped by it.

Almond's formulations have been faulted on three grounds. First, it has been noted that it is not easy to distinguish between the 'deliberate aims of the participants and what takes place because the system seemed to achieve certain aims.' Second, the identification of functions is alleged to rest on the interpretation the analyst places on observed developments. Thus there cannot be complete objectivity. In effect, the number of the identified functions can be more or less than the seven listed by Almond. Third, the approach has been seen as culture-bound since the functions attributed to the political system are too closely modeled on Western political systems. However, Almond's structural-functional approach has been recognized as the major existing tool for genuine comparative analysis of political systems and has been described as a 'fairly realistic interpretation of the nature of political life.'

Starting from the model for instance, an input from the environment goes into the political system and gets converted into what is known as outputs. In the case of the second model, information is crucial to every decision taken by the government. The implication however, is that, when the suppose inputs (as in the structural-functional) and information (as in the cybernetic) are not promptly treated with every seriousness it deserves, there might be crisis in the system. This could further lead to a more severe problem of homeland insecurity and consequently complicate the issue of national security, development and thereby threaten the holistic approach of human development. The second reason for these models has to do with the issue of policies executed by governments (Federal, State and Local). People must respond to the implementation of perceived government programmes. This could be in the form of (1) interest articulation and (2) interest aggregation. Second, on the output side are the functions of (3) rule making, (4) rule-application and (5) rule adjudication. The functions of (6) political communication is undertaken to inform all within the political system and outside of these diverse activities. Additionally, every system performs (7) systems maintenance and adaptation functions through political socialization and recruitment of people. The implication of the crisis in the Niger-Delta region on the national security of Nigeria is enormous especially if we consider the structural violence it has on the whole country. The point here is that, failure to handle the crisis promptly, could lead to a more serve crisis such as terrorism, kidnapping, destruction of oil installation, ethno-religious, politically motivated killing, assassinations and violence. So far, we have witnessed the aforementioned in the past few years in Nigeria. Initially, all these started in the Niger-Delta as a struggle or agitation for resource control and latter spread to other parts of the country. Today, there is virtually any state of the federation that has not witnessed kidnapping, politically motivated killing, assassination, and violence of one form or the other. All these took place probably because the federal, state, and local government neglected the issue of homeland security. The consequences so far have been poverty, insecurity, injustice, inflation, unemployment, underdevelopment and corruption. The imperative of the model therefore lies in taking cognizant of crisis and holistically providing solutions by ways of authoritatively and adequately allocating the values and resources on derivation, needs and necessity formula as was done during the colonial era.

**Government Programmes in the Niger-Delta over the Years**

Public discussions today are awash with criticism of various policies. Human lives political, economic, social are affected and influenced by various governmental policy outputs. For the government to meet the welfare needs of the populace, policies have to be
enacted and implemented. It is on this notion that the word is defined as "actions taken or to be taken and actions not taken or not to be taken by government departments." (Ikelegbe, 1994:1). Jacob and Flink defined policy as: Integrated programme of action which an actor (or group of actors) is accustomed to or in ends to undertake in response to given problems or situations with which he is confronted. (Ikeleghe, 1994:2).

In the same light, Sambo opines that public policy has to do with "the relationship of a government unit to its environment" (Sambo, 1999:283). Certain elements distinguished public policy from other policies. According to Anderson (1975:3,4) as cited in Sambo.

Public policy is purposive or goal oriented action.

Public policy consists of courses or patterns or actions by governmental officials.

Public policy is what government actually do, not what they intend to do or say they are going to do.

Public policy involves some form of overt government action to affect a particular problem; it also involves a decision by government officials not to take action, to do nothing; on some matter on which government involvement is sought.

Public policy is based on law and is authoritative. (Sambo, 1999:283).

The World Bank (1995:vi) defines the Niger Delta in territorial terms as encompassing over 20,000 km² in Southeastern Nigeria with Rivers (and now Bayelsa state and Delta constituting 80% of the Niger-Delta). One could add parts of Ondo and Akwa Ibom states to make up the remaining 20%. The Willink Commission (1958) had taken a narrower view of the Niger Delta as comprises all the states that constitute the proposed Niger Delta Development Commission. Our use of the term Niger Delta in this study will embrace both the geographical and political Niger Delta.

Geographically, the Niger Delta concept is identical with the South-South of Nigeria. To appreciate the peculiar development needs of the Region, there is evidence that the Niger Delta is in the throes of change. A crisis of imbalance which emerges in the area was marked by two contradictory trends. The first is that the bulk of crude oil, Nigeria's main source of revenue, is derived from the area, but the communities "belong to the ranks of the most backward and politically marginalized groups in the country", (Osaghae, 1995:94, 325). Secondly in spite of the resource endowment of the area as oil producing states, the communities have had no access to appreciate technologies to strengthen their capacities for development, instead "environmental degradation through oil exploration, pollution and spillage continued to be their lot, while poverty, unemployment, violence and prostitution are the norms of social life in the area", (Adejumobi and Aderemi, 2002:203). As postulated by Suberu (1996), the basic demands and grievances of Nigeria's oil bearing areas, can be identified under five broad themes. These relates, respectively to:

- The disposition of mineral land rents,
- The application of the derivation principle to the allocation of federally collected mineral revenues,
- The appropriate institutional and fiscal responses to the ecological problems of the oil producing communities and
- The appropriate arrangements for securing the integrity and autonomy of the oil producing communities within the present federal structure.

Perhaps the most logically and legally compelling of the demands of the oil baring communities and states involves their claims to mineral land rents. Traditionally, land rights in Nigeria were vested in the respective local communities. Under the Land Use Decree of 1978, however, the ownership of land in any state of the federation is vested in the State Governor in trust for the people of the state. Thus, both traditionally and legally, the federal government has no direct claims to land in the states (Suberu, 1996:27,28). Yet the federal government of Nigeria has continued to prescribe, how much rent is paid by the oil prospecting companies for land used, and also to collect these rents. The justification of the federal government's action is the Petroleum Decree of 1969 and the relevant provisions of the 1989 constitution which vested in the
federation control of all mineral and gas "in, under or upon the land and territorial waters of Nigeria" (FRN, 1989: Section 42). The scope of these laws was expanded by the Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1978. This legislation vested in the Central Government exclusive sovereign rights with respect to the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed, subsoil and adjacent waters of the exclusive zone up to 200 miles from the sea shore. Contributing to this, Senator David Dafinone, said "The existence and application of the Mineral Act of 1914, part of which has been extracted to form the Petroleum Act of 1969, the Land Use Act of 1978 and the Land (title vesting) Decree of 1993 have directly or indirectly contributed to the present state of neglect, underdevelopment and security of the region" (The Nation, February 17, 2008). Revenue allocation remains a contentious national issue. To a large extent, the oil-producing states have hinged their quest for accelerated development on the former for sharing national revenue and have argued for the derivation principle. Derivation principle has however; been progressively de-emphasized as mineral exploration replaced agricultural exports as the principal earnings in Nigeria. This is shown by Egwemi (1992) who had reiterated '....There have been disheartening contradictions and inconsistencies in Nigeria a nation that recognized 100% derivation as the basis for revenue allocation in 1950, but reduced it to 50 percent at independence in 1960: to 45 percent in 1970; 20 percent in 1975; 1.5 percent in 1982 and 3 percent in 1992 as crude oil found in the Ijaws country became the main source of national revenue' (Egwemi, 1992:132).

Today the derivation principle is put at 13 percent under the 1999 constitution. Two demands are currently in vogue in the oil producing states: first, that the 13 percent derivation formula should be effective the date 1999 constitution came into effect, that is May 29, 1999 instead of January, 2000 as the government made it. Second, that the derivation principle now be applied 100 percent (Naneem, 2001:218). Another contentious issue aggravated by the government policy at the Niger Delta is the states and local governments' creation. Until the creation of Bayelsa state in 1996 the argument was that while the River State, created in 1967 has been left intact, the dominant ethnic groups have proliferated themselves into a multitude of states, and local governments essentially for the sake of sharing oil revenues generated mainly in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta communities continue to feel cheated in the matter of state creation.

Closely related to the issue above are the issues of local autonomy and self determination. In the early 1950s, the people of Niger Delta who were the minorities in Eastern and Western regions were directly affected by the evolving politics of discrimination and exclusion, which forced them to begin the agitation for separate states within the federal framework as against the organization introduced in 1946 by the Richard constitution. As one major ethnic group dominated each region demographically the inevitable consequences were the regionalization of politics and politicization of ethnicity (PEFS, 2004:15). The southern minorities in the East and West were encouraged by the constitutional concept of federalism in the 1954 constitution to intensify their agitation for the transformation of power relations among ethnic groups to a new structural base of more than three regions through state creation,

The colonial government responded to the minority agitations of grievances by setting up on 26 September, 1957 the minorities' commission under Willink. The report submitted on 18 August, 1958 failed to meet the expectations of the minority ethnic groups as it noted that the dismantling of the tripartite federal structure through state creation world "create more problems as great as it sought to cure". However, it declared the Niger Delta area as special because of its "special problems" "and peculiar development needs". On February, 23 1966, an unprecedented political revolution was led by Isaac Adaka Boro, Samuel Onwunaru and Nottingham Dick. The revolution lasted 12 days. Though short lived, it was the first revolutionary move to lead the people of the Niger Delta on a mission of self-determination. The revolution had a peculiar agenda aimed at secession with Boro as the commander-in-chief. Since it failed
the leaders were arrested, tried for treason, sentenced to death; got their sentences commuted to life imprisonment, and later were granted amnesty (PEFS 2004).

Despite the creation of two new states in the Niger Delta and the political epoch after the Nigerian civil war from 1970-1990 the scourges of neglect and marginalization of the area continue un-abated. The 1990 marked the beginning of another phase in the struggles by the Niger Delta in confronting the problems and fundamental issues affecting them and their communities. In that year the MOSOP in concert with the traditional rules of Ogoniland formally proclaimed the Ogoni Bill of Rights to assert their autonomy and their right to self determination? This declaration was predicated on three factors: first, which the communities in the Niger Delta had no visible benefit from the exploration of oil wealth from their land, and the ad-hoc intervention of the state through the establishment of special agencies did not seem to have addressed the issues of marginalization and neglect. Second, the communities were not adequately compensated by the oil companies for damage, and environmental pollution. Third, the attempts to seek redress through legal action were prolonged and expensive, and in most cases, court judgments were defiantly ignored.

At this period also, the fundamental problems shifted from agitation for ethnic autonomy through state creation to that of the survival of the communities in the Niger State. The issues of equitable accommodation changed to citizenship contestations just as the prevalent thinking of accommodation changed to self determination (Osaghae, 2001:1 20). The most notable feature of the struggle of the Niger Delta people was the trend over the formal declaration for self determination. Such declarations after the Ogoni Bill of Rights were Akalaba Declaration of the Egi People, the Kaiama Declaration of Ijaws people, the Oron Bill of Rights and the Urhobos Economic Summit Resolutions.

The government response to the struggle with action plans designed to deal with the wave of struggles became bloody and murderous through repressive actions by the police or the military or through judicial murder. The evidence included the Umuchem Massacre of 1990, the execution of the Ogoni activists and environmentalists, and the Odi Massacre of 1999. Among the various interventionist agencies, such as 1950s Niger Delta Development Board to look into the development needs of the region; Babangida Oil Mineral Producing Area's Development Commission (OMPADEC), and Niger Delta Development Commission, NDDC which was established by the NDDC Act 2000 by Obasanjo's administration with the mandate to facilitate the "rapid even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful" (Tell, February, 2, 2008). Since 2001 when the commission commenced operations, its funding authorities have consistently observed in the breach the financial provisions of the Act. This has crippled the activities of the NDDC. In six years, 2001-2006, the net receipts of the nine states came to over N2 billion. By the rules, the NDDC should have received N318.1 billion but instead received some 93.5 billion. This represent less than 30% of is expected revenue, leaving unpaid the huge sum of N225, 675, 910, 00 (some N225.7 billion). The oil companies have not performed much better. Straightway, the NDDC faces a major problem of coping with the enigmatic processes in which the secretive budgets of these companies are shrouded. The oil majors, by the requirements of the Acts, are expected to contribute 3 percent of their approved amount budgets, to the commission. Yet, in the same year period of 2001 to 2006, while their expected contributions came to $1,544,884,996, only $1,271,818,963 was paid to NDDC, leaving a balance of $241,973,795 which in naira terms, is N34.8 billion. But most worrisome, in terms of conduct and attitude amongst the oil companies, is the blatant refusal by some of them to pay a kobo to the commission in nearly seven years of its operations (Tell Editorial, June 18, 2007).

To make worse the situation, the government recent policy output ordering the government and parastatals to return to the treasury unspent
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budget allocation. On the January 16, the late President Umaru Ya'adua told the South/South senators who visited him that the accumulated N293, billion owed to the NDDC from 2001 to 2007 had "Expired". This policy option has equally generated a rumpus and possibly renews insurgency in the Niger Delta. Various questions are asked. According to Ledum Mitee, President of the MOSOP when commenting on the situation puts it that:

"We completely reject that! If the government thinks that the vision of this administration is hinged on rule of law, then the best way to demonstrate that is to remedy any injustice occasioned by non-adherence to the rule of law. I have never had of debt expiring anywhere in the world. I think it is the most unfortunate comment and it shows some unscrupulousness about dealing with the issue of the Niger Delta". (Tell, February, 4, 2008). He cautions the federal government that this:

Is going to send a negative impression everywhere and I think government needs to correct it immediately.

Corroborating this, another Ijaw leader, hinged this policy option on deliberate attempt of the government to further cripple and impoverish the Niger Delta through deliberate withholding of fund from the NDDC:

It is another pointer to the fact that Obasanjo deliberately caused the Niger Delta crisis by withholding the money meant for the development of the region. If we are talking about peace in the region, whatever is owed NDDC should be paid or be incorporated in this year budget". (Tell, February, 4, 2008).

Pointing at the governments deliberate propagation of violence and political insurrection and insurgency at the Niger Delta, Asari Dokubo poignantly comments that: "If NDDC know that it is short changed, it should tell the whole world and let the world judge who is sponsoring violence in the Niger Delta."

Effects of Homeland Insecurity in Nigeria

CATEGORY "A"

1. September 9, 1999
Enugu State: Mr. Sunday Ugwu was murdered: A case of mistaken identity. The victim was an elder brother of Hon. Nwabueze, the target who is a member of Enugu House of Assembly.

2. December, 21, 2001
Osun State: Odunayo Olajbajwu was murdered at Ile-Ife, Osun State. A victim of political violence, he was a member of the Osun State House of Assembly. His death was "unfortunately" linked to the political Intra-party crisis in the state.

3. December, 23, 2001
Osun State: Chief Bola Ige, Late Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Federal Republic of Nigeria. He was gunned down in his bedroom by yet to be identified gunmen. Although his death remained a riddle, his assassination was also associated with the Intra-party crisis in Osun State.

4. March 05, 2002
Oyo State: Mrs. Emily Omoje, Her death was a result of acid poured on her inside her car; she was a prominent member of Alliance for Democracy (AD).

5. August 13, 2002
Ondo State: Janet Olapade, a prominent Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) leader stabbed to death by assailants, many youths, for preventing them from pasting posters of a chairmanship candidate on her house. This was presumably a political conflict.

6. August, 15, 2002
Alhaji Ahmed Patehi, Kwara State PDP Chairman murdered along with his orderly when his car was accosted on his way to Abuja. He was killed at Aihetoro, Kogi State.

7. August, 20, 2002
Anambra State: Victor Nwakwo: The victim was the younger brother of Authur Nwakwo, a highly profile politician and founder of the Eastern Union Mandate (EUM). He was killed inside his house at about 1:00am.

8. September 01, 2002
Anambra State: Bar. Barnabas Igwe, Chairman, Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Anambra State chapter. He was brutally murdered alongside his pregnant wife, Mrs. D. Igwe on the same day.

9. September 13, 2002
Bauchi State: Alhaji Isyaku Molid, the victim was until his death, the National Vice Chairman of the United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) for the North-West, possibly a result of political violence.

Lagos: Mr. Dele Arojo: The victim was the Peoples Democratic Party's (PDP) gubernatorial aspirant for Lagos State.

11. December 13, 2002
Rivers State, Mr. Ogu Ibolon, an elected Local Government Chairman under ANPP was killed on his way from Port-Harcourt.

Oyo State: (30 people mostly elderly men) unspecified names died from gunshot wounds. This was an Intra-party clash at the Oyo State secretariat of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP).

Yobe State: Adamu Waziri: He was killed during an Intra-party conflict between the rival gangs from ANPP and PDP.

Delta State: A soldier and 3 youths killed. Clash over PDP primary elections. The cause was the rivalry between factions within the PDP.

15. February 3, 2003
Ondo State: Ishola Ayedemi was murdered. It was caused by
fractional fighting in the Alliance for Democracy (AD) Party.

Borno State: Mallam Inuwu Kabo, Assassination attempt on the life of the speaker, Borno State House of Assembly, his driver was killed.

16. February 9, 2003
Borno State: Mallam Inuwu Kabo, Assassination attempt on the life of the speaker, Borno State House of Assembly, his driver was killed.

17. February 24, 2002
Imo State: Chief Egbonaya Uche, Senatorial Candidate under the ANPP, Imo State was murdered.

18. February 25, 2002
Rivers States, Hon. Monday Ndor, a stalwart of the ANPP was assassinated in his house in Port-Harcourt, Rivers State.

19. February 26, 2003
Imo State: Theodore Agwatu, he was until his death a principal secretary to the Imo State Governor.

20. February 27, 2003
Benue State: 8 people died in Political Clashes. ANPP and PDP thugs engaged themselves in a battle for supremacy in Jato-Aka, Kwaonde Local Government Area.

21. March 5, 2003
Abuja (FCT), Chief Marshal Harry, he was murdered in his Abuja residence. The victim started as a PDP stalwart and later decamped to the ANPP. He was the South-South coordinator of the presidential campaign of ANPP. His death was said to be politically motivated.

22. March 12, 2003
Kebbi State: 20 Houses burnt to aches 5 peoples were killed in the process. It was as a result of conflict between ANPP and PDP supporters.

23. March 20, 2003
Cross Rivers State: One person killed during clashes between ANPP and PDP gubernatorial supporters.

Kano State: Chuba Okadigbo was the running mate to Mohammed Buhari ANPP Presidential aspirant. His death was linked to a tear gas spread in his car by the Police at the ANPP rally in Kano on September 23, 2003. The ruling party was accused of using the police to terminate his life. PDP denied this allegation. He died in Abuja 25, September 2003.

25. February 6, 2004
Delta State: Di Chief Amana Soari Kala Dikibo, National Vice Chairman, PDP, South-South. He died on his way to Asaba, Delta State Capital to attend a seminar organized by the party.

26. March 3, 2004
Kogi State: Mr. Luke Shigaba, until his death in the Hand of assassins, he was the Chairman of Bassa Local Government.

27. March 7, 2004
Kogi State: Philip Olurunnipa, he was until his death chairman Kogi State Electoral Commission.

28. March 12, 2007
Kogi State: Alhaji Adejo Akubo, until his death, he was the PDP Anka Ward Chairman.

29. April 2, 2008
Kogi State: Moses Usman Akoke murdered in his house.

Kogi State: Daniel Enetola, killed along Ajakuta-Itobe Road, on his way from Lokoja.

31. May, 2009
Kogi State: Aba Mohammed, killed in Ejule, inside his house for decamping from ANPP.


Categor: "B"

May 31, 1999
A carry-over of the violent clash between the Ijaw and Itsekiri communities, which had started under Military administration in Warri, Delta State.

May 30-June 9, 1999
Renewed Warri communal clash in Delta State.

July 2, 1999
Ethnic clash between the Yorubas and the Hausa-Fulani residing in Sagamu, Ogun State.

July 18, 1999
Oodua peoples congress and Hausa traders clashed at Sagamu, Ogun State.

July 22, 1999
A spill-over of the July 2 crisis in Sagamu. The Hausa targeted the Yoruba as a vengeance on the killings of their kit and kin in Yoruba land.

July 22, 1999
Kano reprisal killing: Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeance on the killing of their kit and kin in Sagamu. Their target was the Yoruba community.

November 8, 1999
This occurred in Odi community in Bayelsa State. "The town received a shelling and bombardment with artillery form soldiers" (Elaiogwu, 2005).

November 25, 1999
Communal clash in Lagos Oodua peoples Congress and Hausa traders.

January 25, 2000
Communal clash in Brass Local Government area of Bayelsa State.

January 29, 2000
Communal clash in Etsako Local Government area of Edo State.

January 30, 2000
Communal at Etsako Local Government area of Edo State.

February 2, 2000
Boundary dispute between communities in Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers State.

February 21, 2000
Sharia riots in Kaduna.

February 28, 2000
A clash between Muslim and Christian extremists in Kaduna State over the introduction of Sharia in some parts of the country.

February 28, 2000
Religious riot in Aba, Abia State, reprisal killing from the Kaduna mayhem.

February 28, 2000
Kaduna Mayhem (Kaduna State): Kaduna city exploded in violence as Muslim and Christian extremists and other hoodlums clashed over the proposal to introduce Sharia.

March 5, 2000
Epoch of Ile-Modakeke war of attrition.

March 10, 2000
Communal clash between Ile and Modakeke communities in Ijesha, Osun State. Although this crisis had been on for several years the march 10 crisis was believed to have heightened by local government council creation and the tussle over the location of the Headquarters of the newly
created local government.

**March 16, 2000**
Renewed hostilities between the people of Eleme and Okrika in Rivers State.

**March 28, 2000**
Religious riots in Damboa, Borno State.

**April 8, 2000**
Communal clash in Ovia South Local Government area of Edo State.

**April 14, 2000**
Agyragu Crisis (Nasarawa State): Communal clash that started with a protest against the location of locals government headquarters. The militant youth group started the riot and later took to the streets, killing and destroying.

**April 14, 2000**
Communal clash that started over the location of local government council in Agyragu, Nasarawa State.

**May 2, 2000**
Jos mayhem: Another mayhem that followed PDP congress but later took an ethno-religious colour.

**May 4, 2000**
Another round of communal clash between the warring communities of Ile and Modakeke in Osun State.

**May 18, 2000**
Local farmers and Fulani cattle rearers clash in Saki, Oyo State.

**May 23, 2000**
Renewed religious riot in Kaduna.

**June 5, 2000**
Epoch of the Owo mayhem in Ondo State

**June 12, 2000**
Communal clash in Isoko North Local Government area of Edo State.

**June 23, 2000**
Communal clash between the people of Iko Offiong and Oku-Iboku of Cross River State.

**July 2000**
Tsagari crisis (Kwara): Clash between Tsagari and Share communities of Kwara State which claimed several lives.

**July 11, 2000**
The commencement of communal clash at Ikare Akoko, Ondo State.

**July 12, 2000**
Ethnic violence in Nasarawa State.

**July 21, 2000**
Renewed hostilities between the Ijaw and Urhobos in Delta State.

**August 12, 2000**
Communal clash in Bendel Local Government area of Abia state.

**August 22, 2000**
Violent clash at Agbomma community in Epe Local Government area of Lagos State.

**September 8, 2000**
Kaltungo religious (Gombe state): A religious violence that was sparked off by the presence of the states Sharia implementation committee.

**October 16, 2000**
Igbos and Hausa traders clashed at Alaba Rago market area of Lagos State.

**October 17, 2000**
A face-off between the militant OPC (O'Odua People's Congress) members and Ilorin community over the supremacy of Emirate system in Kwara State.

**October 18, 2000**
Another face off between the militant OPC and Hausa/Fulani in Ajegunle, Lagos.

**October 21, 2000**
Ethnic crisis in Minna, Niger State after the OPC assault on the Hausa/Fulani in both Lagos and Ilorin.

**March 13, 2001**
Renewed communal clashes at Owo, Ondo State.

**April 13, 2001**
Religious riot in Kano State.

**May 12, 2001**
Communal clash between the Ijaw and Itsekiri of Delta State.

**June 28, 2001**
Agyragu Crisis (Nasarawa): An ethnic conflict between the Tiv and Azara indigenes. It started with gruesome killing of an Azara traditional leader, and later spread to the Tiv village, with the Tiv community on the defense.

**June 28, 2001**
A religious riot between the Tiv and the Azara origins in Nasarawa State. It started as a retaliation of the gruesome killing of an Azara traditional ruler and later spread to Tiv village.

**July 2, 2001**
Communal clash between Odimodu and Ogulagba communities of Delta State.

**September 7, 2001**
A serious violent ethno-religious crisis between the Muslim Hausa/Fulani and the Christian indigenes in Jos, Plateau State. It started as a politically motivated crisis between the Jasa/Jawa Development Association and Plateau Youth Council over political appointment in Jos North Local Government Council.

**September 7, 2001**
Religious clash in Jos, Plateau State.

**September 15, 2001**
A reprisal killing of Northerners in Onitsha, Anambra State.

**September 16, 2001**
Religious riot in Kano.

**September 18, 2001**
Religious riot in Benue State.

**October 12, 2001**
Kano riot: A peaceful anti-American protest over the bombing of Afghanistan turned violent, taking ethnic and religious dimension, it degenerated into uncontrollable violence which claimed lives and damaged properties and places of worship.

**October 29, 2001**
Tiv-Jukun/Fulani Conflict: An ethnic clash between Tivs and Jukun/Fulani which was an extension of the May 2001 clash and could be linked to the protracted dispute between both sides. News watch reported that 16 soldiers were killed which later led to the gruesome revenge on the Tivs, by the Nigerian Army.

**November 2, 2001**
The clash started on a political ground over the relocation of the Local Government Headquarters that later resulted in ethno-religious dimension in Gwantu, Kaduna State.

**December 30, 2001**
Vwag crisis: A violent communal conflict in Vwang district between the indigenes and non indigenes, exploded in the
backdrop of the September 7 Jos crisis. It started when an illegal group of 40 men attacked the District Head of Vwang. It also had religious colouring.

January 12, 2002
Oodua peoples Congress clash at Owo, Ondo State.

January 18, 2002
Awe crisis: A renewed communal clash between two indigenous communities in Awe Local Government of Nasarawa State. The cause was not certain but two people were killed and several others injured.

February 2, 2002
Oodua peoples Congress and Hausa people clashed at Idi-Araba, Lagos State.

February 26, 2002
Communal clash between Apprapum and Osatara communities of Cross River State.

March 10, 2002
Egboro youths revolt on local government creation

March 30-April 2, 2002
All peoples party Intra party clash at Ilorin, Kwara State.

May 2, 2002
Political violence that followed the PDP ward congress but later took and ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State.

May 27, 2002
Fulani-Irigwe crisis: An ethnic clash between the Hausa/Fulani and the Irigwe indigenes in Basa, Plateau which was said to be a reprisal attack.

June 1, 2002
Yelwa Shendam Mayhem (Plateau): A religious cum ethnic fracas between the native people (predominantly Christians) and Hausa settlers (predominantly Muslims). This violence extended to about four Local Government Councils in Southern Plateau.

July 1, 2002
Wase (Plateau): The Yelwa Shendam riots spilled over to Wase.

August 31, 2002
Communal clash at Ado-Ekiti.

September 3, 2002
Renewed communal clashes at Owo, Ondo State.

November 21, 2002
Religious riots in Kaduna State and Abuja.

Early March, 2003
Clash between armed supporters of the People Democratic Party (PDP) and All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Sokoto State.

March 3, 2003
State chairman of the ANPP reported shooting attack on him while in vehicle in Ebonyi State.

March 4, 2003
Clash between the PDP and ANPP after PDP state governors convoy was attacked in Edo State.

March 6, 2003
Attack on ANPP senatorial candidates convoy in Cross Rivers State.

March 10 and 11, 2003
Peoples Democratic Party/All Nigeria Peoples Party clash in Kebbi State.

March 11-12, 2003
Clash between PDP and Alliance for Democracy (AD) in Lagos state.

March 15, 16, 2003
Clash between PDP and ANPP supporters in Kebbi state.

July 1, 2003
Edo/Kogi: Communal clashes between border communities in Edo and Kogi States Ekepeado and Ogori over land ownership.

July 14, 2003
Communal clash in Epen, a community in war ravaged Uwie Local Government Council in Delta State. It was connected to political rivalry in the area.

January 1, 2004
Ganye, Adamawa: Clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers over grazing lands.

January 1, 2004
Yobe: Militant Islamic group operating under the name of Muhajar launched a Taliban-like attack on police. Men of the Nigerian Army killed five and arrested several others.

February 1, 2004
Wase/Kanam (Plateau): Violent clash between Mavo and Taroh communities, which claimed 11 lives. Suspected Taroh youth were alleged to have raided Mavo villages.

February 1, 2004
Wase/Kanam, (Plateau): Communal clash over land ownership between Minda and Kparev groups. Several lives were lost.

February 17, 2004
Politically triggered mayhem in Takum LG between supporters of PDP and National Democratic Party (NDP) over local elections.

April 3, 2004
Makarfi, Kaduna: Religious protest in Makarfi town over the desecration of the Quran by a Christian teenager.

April 11, 2004
Langtang South, Plateau: Continued clashes that led to the led to the sacking of Taroh villages in Langtang South LGC by suspected Hausa-Fulani insurgents.

April 26, 2004
Bakin Chiwawa Plateau: Renewed hostilities launched by suspected displaced Fulani herdsmen. The conflict was believed to be spill-over of the ethno religious crisis that has been bedeviling southern Plateau local government of Langtang south and North, Wase, Kanam and Shendam.

May 1, 2004
Ethno-religious crisis that claimed over 650 lives in Yelwan Shendam, Plateau state.

May 1, 2004
Yelwa Shendam, Plateau State: A fresh ethno-religious mayhem that claimed over 650 lives and over 250 women abducted by suspected Taroh militia.

May 12, 2004
Kano state crisis following Yelwan Shendam ethno religious crisis.

May 12, 2004
Kano: Kano mayhem following the Yelwa Shendam ethno-religious crisis in Plateau. Non Muslims were attacked in reprisal of the Plateau crisis. Over 200 lives were lost and the traditional ruler of the area deposed.

June 8, 2004
Konshisha/Gwer, Benue: Boundary disputes between neighbouring Konshisha and Gwer communities. Thirteen lives were lost.

June 8, 2004
Numan, Adamawa: Ethno-religious crisis in Numan over the construction of a mosque minaret over the Humma Bachamans palace. Over 50 people were feared killed and the traditional ruler of the area deposed.

August 3, 2004
Quanpam, Plateau: Fresh outbreak of violence in Lankaka village. Suspected armed militia from neighbouring state allegedly stormed the village community killing two and razing twenty houses.

September 27, 2004
Limankara, Borno: A self-styled Taliban group hiding on the Goza hill and Madara mountains on the north-eastern boarder with Cameroon raid police station killing officers and stealing ammunition.

November 10, 2004
Anambra political crisis where hundreds of armed youth stormed the state capital destroying properties.

January 16, 2005
Religious mayhem between O’odua peoples Congress (a Yoruba militant group) and muslims over the erection of Ogun Shrine in a Muslim praying ground in Ipakodo, Lagos State.

February, 2005
Clash between nomads and farmers over claims of invasion of farmlands and destruction of crops in Ringim, Jigawa State.

February, 2005
Blood bath caused by invasion of Ibidi and Odioma communities by armed men in military uniform in Odioma Bayelsa State.

March 5, 2005
Communal clash between Maruta community in Jigawa State and Burmin in Bauchi State over relocation of market.

May 11, 2005
A communal clash between the Guza and Mariri communities in Lere, Kaduna State over relocation of a secondary school.

June 2005
A renewed clash between Sunni and Shiite sects over use of mosque in Sokoto state.

September, 2009
Boko-Haram in Bauchi, Maiduguri and some part of Northern states.

November, 2009
Kala-kato crisis in Maiduguri and Bauchi state.

December, 2009
Jos religious crises between Christians and Muslim after local elections.

January, 2010
Religious crisis between Christians and Muslim faithful.


Summary and Conclusion
Nigeria has witnessed countless number of political turbulence. Yet she has weathered them. Between 1967 and 1970, Nigeria witnessed a civil war that shook the very foundation of the polity with over 3 million causality and properties that cannot be quantified. Nigeria, since 1950s has found the Niger Delta crisis a bitter pill difficult to swallow. The Niger Delta, an oil rich region of the country, produced the wealth of the nation; over 90% of the national revenue comes from that region which however is characterized by poverty and infrastructural decay. In addition, the population of the Niger Delta believes they are marginalized. There exist various legislations and decrees which are the legal instruments that have led to the dispossessing of the land and resources of the Niger Delta from the people. The history of the area in the last forty years of oil exploration confirm that the people of the Niger Delta have suffered most from the direct consequences of oil extraction with evidence of ecological degradation affecting agriculture, health and their economic conditions. To them Ogonis, Ijaws, Boris, Itsekiris, llajes etc, they have come to see their struggle as just a course against tyranny and injustice.

Conclusively, the urgent attention to the crisis at the Niger Delta will save the country of monumental resources to prosecute another civil war. It is axiomatic, that “whosoever makes a peaceful change impossible, make a violent change inevitable”. The October, 1, 2010 bomb explosion in Abuja (the FCT), and other bomb explosions in the some parts of the Northern Nigeria, are all indication of insecurity in our homeland security that requires urgent attention.

Recommendations
Drawing heavily from the foregoing, the study recommend as follows:

- That the federal, State, and Local governments should develop and fund a centre for homeland security, this will create vital awareness and consciousness;
- Homeland security should be taken seriously and holistically so as to avoid structural violence in other part of the country;
- Vigilante groups should be encouraged at all levels to assist the present security operatives in the county. The use of native or indigenes for security is pro-homeland security and this will promote a secured environment;
- Preventing crisis in the Niger-Delta region will accelerate development in the entire country, this could be achieve through
rigorous and evenly distribution of resources and giving the Niger-Delta people what is rightly due to them;

- All the decrees and legislations that transferred the ownership of the land resources to the federal government are withdrawn. This will accord the people of the Niger-Delta the sense of belonging in their country and improve our federalism;
- All the funds that are owed to the intervening agencies such as NDDC should be released. This will enable the agency to implement the comprehensive master plan for the development of the Niger-Delta region and create more employment;
- As suggested earlier, allowing oil producing communities to control proceeds from oil extracted from their land, while paying taxes/royalties to the federal government, will enable the people of the Niger-Delta to evolve a home grown approach to solve their problems. This will improve homeland security;

There is need for the government to examine the proclamation by the people of the Niger-Delta e.g. Ogoni Bill of Right and the Kaiama Development with regard to claims of ownership, resources assess and control, environmental justice and clamour for true federalism. This will promote competition among the component units in the federation, thereby reducing the power of the central government.

The government should have the political and moral will to fully implement the recommendations of the Lt. Gen. Alexander led special security committee on oil producing areas. This will further help reduce incessant ethno-religious crisis such as the Book-Haram and the Maintasine groups in the Northern part of Nigeria;

- The oil producing companies should be compelled to pay royalties to the constituted centers for homeland security so as to make them functional.

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